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TRAVEL INTO THE FUTURE OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
Richard F. Storrow
Today, cross-border assisted reproductive care can in many cases be
pursued with impunity, given the policy of free movement of goods and services
that serves as a cornerstone of unity in Europe and North America. Travel in the
future of reproductive technology, however, will occasion risks that reproductive
travelers have not faced since the days when Germany and Ireland engaged in
internationally condemned practices aimed at punishing their citizens who
crossed into other countries to obtain abortions illegal at home. In countries
where pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of embryos is outlawed because it is
believed to be dangerously akin to eugenics, travel to evade the law has
commenced and will increase as low-cost methods of conducting such diagnoses
enter the market. What the future of crossing borders for reproductive
technology holds, then, lies in part in the extraterritorial effect that countries will
choose to give their laws in a globalizing world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Procreation is a powerful human drive that inspires such deep religious,
moral, and ethical convictions that, at a fundamental level, we know we need to
pay close attention to and thoughtfully examine the implications of innovations
in reproductive technology. Andrew Torrance’s vivid account of the profound
impact inexpensive genetic tests will have on human reproduction raises a host of
intriguing questions about the future of reproductive technology.1 In at least one
respect, the future is now: with every innovation that places assisted reproduction
within the reach and awareness of millions of individuals around the world come
calls for restraint. We fear many things—threats to the health of patients and
offspring, the exploitation of third-party participants in the quest to bear children,
and taints on the reputations of physicians and governments insufficiently
responsive to all that is at stake.
Torrance believes that enhancements in genetic technologies coupled
with recent significant changes to patent law may alter the calculus of innovation
and access in the realm of reproductive technologies.2 He foresees a future in
which inexpensive genetic tests may greatly expand access by individual patients
to very specific knowledge about the reproductive experience they are likely to
have, perhaps most significantly the probability of success and the risks that will
attend the process for both prospective parents and potential offspring.3 As with
any technology designed to satisfy consumer demand, the increasing efficacy of
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genetic tests and the expected drop in their cost over time will tap new markets
for information about the genetic determinants of human traits.
A potential wrinkle in such a future is the very legal regime that makes
the development of genetic tests attractive to innovators and entrepreneurs. This
interplay between patent and innovation plays out according to a familiar script,
the “orthodox view” in Torrance’s parlance.4 Gene sequences are significant in
scientific endeavor because their discovery may lead to the development of
important diagnostics and other products. Without the protection of the limited
monopoly of patent, we are told, scientific innovators will lack incentives to
invest capital in developing new technologies of this sort.5 Patent protection is
necessary, then, to inhibit access to new technologies at precisely the moment
they appear poised to be of the most benefit.6 Requiring people to pay for the
technology they want to use creates the proper incentive for scientists and
entrepreneurs to develop technology further. Without patents, so the story goes,
there might well be no technology to resort to.
The familiar script takes an unfamiliar turn when it comes to mapping
the human genome. The development in patent law that concerns Torrance7 and
others is the extension of patent protection (which seems perfectly appropriate
for techniques developed to detect the presence of certain gene sequences) to the
gene sequences themselves. The immediate question in the battle for ownership
of the human genome is whether gene sequences, since they are naturally
occurring, are appropriate subject matter for patents at all.8 Then there is the
policy question: might patenting gene sequences actually undermine innovation
in this area?9 Might gene patents have the even more perverse effect of
facilitating the exploitation of patients and disenfranchised communities and
jeopardizing individual and public health?10 If so, perhaps human rights
principles of equality and dignity should control over more technical arguments
about innovation and technological advancement.11

4

Id. at 274.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 191,
210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (detailing the argument of the patent holder and the supporting amici).
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11
See generally Jonathan D. Kahn, What‟s the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human
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A clear line has yet to be drawn between patents on diagnostic techniques
and patents on gene sequences.12 The law in this area is still in flux. Trial court
rumblings signal impatience with gene patents,13 but it will be many years before
this question is resolved. In the meantime, given the current state of the patent
law landscape, it seems likely that patents on specific gene sequences and patents
on the diagnostics themselves will inhibit access to the tests people want for
mapping their reproductive lives.
Torrance’s prescience is his insight that truly “low-cost” genetic tests
will depend to a large extent on the direction of patent law. This response
recognizes that some jurisdictions will refuse to permit pre-implantation genetic
testing altogether. Given these dynamics, potential consumers of such tests will
travel to jurisdictions where they are permitted or are less expensive.14 Travel in
the future of reproductive technology may entail some dangers, however. If
current indicators are not mere isolated instances, we may see either
extraterritorial prosecution of such travel or other legal responses aimed at
making it less likely that consumers of low-cost genetic tests have anything to
gain from a cross-border quest to attain their reproductive goals.
II. CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE CARE
The existence of patents that would make genetic tests prohibitively
expensive for many or would place second opinions out of financial reach, makes
it probable that those with the financial means to do so will travel to jurisdictions
where these tests and related care remain affordable. In addition, where genetic
testing is outlawed, travel to permissive jurisdictions will ensue. Travel for
genetic testing, then, will take its place alongside other forms of medical tourism
that is pursued in the quest for health care that is either too expensive or
prohibited at home.
Indeed, the evidence shows that cross-border
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) is already a going concern.15
At its root, travelling abroad to acquire assisted reproduction that is out
of reach locally is an exercise of personal autonomy.16 Nonetheless, unfettered
choice in matters of assisted reproduction is not a feature of most developed
countries, where the general conviction is that reproductive choice is justifiably

12

See Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of Useful
Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 242 (2009) (“[I]t is not a question of whether to pursue
patents for our tests, but rather where in the research process we should consider them.”).
13
See, e.g., Ass‟n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
14
Tanja Krones & Gerd Richter, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD): European
Perspectives and the German Situation, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 623, 632 (2004); B.M. Dickens,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and „Savior Siblings‟, 88 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS
91, 93 (2005).
15
Press Release, ESHRE, Europe struggles to meet the legal, ethical and regulatory challenges
posed by more patients travelling abroad for PGD (July 2, 2007).
16
Eric Blyth & Abigail Farrand, Reproductive Tourism: A Price Worth Paying for Reproductive
Autonomy?, 25 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 91, 102, 107-08 (2005).
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constrained by legal regulation.17 The laissez-faire approach of the United States
is of course an exception, but most other developed countries have enacted
comprehensive legislative schemes that can be categorized in the following
manner: (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.18 Permissive
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Spain exhibit tolerance toward
most well-known forms of assisted reproduction except commercial surrogacy.19
These jurisdictions typically allow the use of third-party gametes and embryos
and do not limit access to assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) based on
marital status or sexual orientation. Research using supernumerary embryos, the
cloning of embryos for stem cell research, and the selection of embryos with the
aid of pre-implantation diagnosis are also permitted in liberal jurisdictions.20
Cautious jurisdictions such as France and Denmark do not have widespread
restrictions but nonetheless have strict rules requiring anonymity in gamete
donation21 and bans on surrogacy.22 Cautious jurisdictions may allow preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) only in special cases and may prohibit
the creation of embryos through in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) or therapeutic
cloning for research purposes.23 Cautious jurisdictions may, however, permit
research on embryos that remain from couples who have completed their
infertility treatment.24 In addition to these restrictions on practice, France permits
only stable heterosexual couples to have access to assisted reproduction.25 The
prohibitive approach stands in contrast to the liberal approach by placing limits
on embryo and stem cell research and embryo selection following PGD.26
Prohibitive countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, for
example, outlaw techniques that are elsewhere embraced as mainstream

17

See HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., FERTILITY AND STERILITY, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
FERTILITY
SOCIETIES
SURVEILLANCE
2010
13-15
(2010),
http://www.iffsreproduction.org/documents/IFFS_Surveillance_2010.pdf [hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010].
A discussion of the policies underlying these restraints is beyond the scope of this response. It is
sufficient to mention here that restrictions on assisted reproduction may arise from fears about harm
to future children, harm to third-party gamete donors or surrogates, or harm to human dignity
generally.
18
See Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of Assisted
Conception—Room for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD 305, 306 (Donald Evans ed.,
1996).
19
See generally IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 17.
20
THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE: POLICY NETWORKS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 7, 9 (Eric Monpetit et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE
POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY].
21
IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 17, at 65. Israel is another country of this type. Id.
22
Id. 109-10.
23
THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 9.
24
Id.
25
HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., FERTILITY AND STERILITY, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FERTILITY
SOCIETIES
SURVEILLANCE
2007
S18
(2007),
http://www.iffsreproduction.org/documents/Surveillance_07.pdf [hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE
2007].
26
THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 20, at 9.
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procedures. In these jurisdictions, oocyte donation is banned outright.27 Austria
and Italy also prohibit sperm donation in IVF.28 In addition to banning these
forms of third-party gamete donation, Switzerland prohibits PGD.29 It is joined
in this restriction by Chile, China, Ivory Coast, and the Philippines.30 Although
not always requiring PGD, non-medical sex selection is banned in the United
Kingdom, India, Canada, and Taiwan.31
Cross-border reproductive travel out of cautious and prohibitive
jurisdictions to more permissive jurisdictions is well known,32 and, at least when
conducted within Europe, is protected by the principle of free movement of
persons enshrined in the Treaty Establishing the European Community.33 In
addition, movement out of permissive and laissez-faire jurisdictions occurs with
an aim to acquire treatment more quickly, to reduce costs, or to acquire treatment
that is simply not offered in the country of origin “because it is not considered
sufficiently safe or because it is still under experimental evaluation.”34
Markets for cross-border reproductive transactions and for medical
tourism generally have developed in a multiplicity of countries in response to
international demand.35 The business is authentically global in scope in that
cross-border movements are sometimes facilitated by clinics or brokers at home
who have partnerships abroad. For example, an agency in the United States may
refer couples needing surrogacy services to clinics in India or Ukraine.36
Physicians in Italy or Turkey, where artificial insemination is banned, may refer

27

IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 17, at 47-48. The European Court of Human Rights, in
S.H. and Others v. Austria, disapproved of Austria’s ban on oocyte donation and its ban on sperm
donation for IVF. S.H. and Others v. Austria, 57813/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). I have argued that
the case establishes proportionality review as the proper standard by which countries will have to
justify their restrictions on assisted reproduction in the future. See R.F. Storrow, The Pluralism
Problem in Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 25 HUM. REPROD. 2939 (2010).
28
IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 17, at 46-48.
29
Id. at 100.
30
Id. at 101.
31
Id. at 95, 96.
32
F. Shenfield et al., Cross Border Reproductive Care in Six European Countries, 25 HUM.
REPROD. 1361, 1362 (2010).
33
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18(1), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html#C_2002325EN.003301_6_r
ef (“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect.”).
34
Anna Pia Ferraretti et al., Cross-border Reproductive Care: A Phenomenon Expressing the
Controversial Aspects of Reproductive Technologies, 20 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 261, 265
(2010).
35
See generally articles in the International Medical Travel Journal, available at
http://www.imtjonline.com/welcome/ and Medical Tourism Magazine, available at
http://www.medicaltourismmag.com/.
36
E.g., Global Surrogacy Solutions, http://www.globalsurrogacysolutions.com (last visited Dec. 26,
2010).
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couples to nearby Switzerland, Greece, or Cyprus.37 Destination countries in the
developing world are coming forward to generate foreign demand with language
pitched to consumerist sensibilities.38 Some of these countries may soon enact
laws that will make it easier for consumers to obtain the services they desire.39
Although cross-border reproductive care exists at the intersection of
cross-border medical care and assisted reproduction, and thus raises many of the
same concerns arising in those contexts, some concerns are particularly salient
when it comes to crossing borders. By crossing borders, patients are seeking a
different legal, economic, or service-delivery climate than exists at home. Thus,
five primary concerns arise from cross-border reproductive travel:
(1)
40
compromised access to necessary health care services at home; (2) the sacrifice
of distributive justice when access to necessary procedures depends upon the
ability to travel;41 (3) the quality and safety of services both at home and
abroad;42 (4) whether responsible citizenship is undermined by traveling abroad
to evade the law at home;43 and (5) the exploitation of or harm to individuals and
communities that have become the destinations of reproductive travel.44 Related
to this last concern is evidence that where clinics in developing countries step
forward to fulfill foreign demand, there is now “an emerging divide between
those clinics offering health services to local patients, and those concentrating on
the provision of services for foreign clients.”45 This can lead to fewer resources
to attend to the health care of the local population,46 including the migration of

37

Zeynep Gürtin-Broadbent, Problems with Legislating Against „Reproductive Tourism,‟
BIONEWS, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_56954.asp; Turkey Bans Trips Abroad
for
Artificial
Insemination,
THE
TELEGRAPH,
March
15,
2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/7450571/Turkey-bans-trips-abroad-forartificial-insemination.html; Shenfield et al., supra note 32, at 1366.
38
Elise Smith et al., Reproductive Tourism in Argentina: Clinic Accreditation and its Implications
for Consumers, Health Professionals and Policy Makers, 10 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 59,
60, 65 (2010).
39
See, e.g., The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2010, Ministry of Health &
Family
Welfare
pt.
6
(India),
available
at
http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf
(containing
provisions legalizing commercial surrogacy and providing that the commissioning parents’ name
shall appear on the birth certificate).
40
Guido Pennings et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border reproductive
care,
23
HUM.
REPROD.
2182,
2182
(2008),
available
at
http://www.eshre.com/binarydata.aspx?type=doc/Task_force_XV_cross_border.pdf
(describing
lack of technology or reimbursement as indicating a “structural deficit”).
41
Id.
42
Id.; Shenfield et al., supra note 32, at 1362; Smith et al., supra note 38, at 59, 65.
43
Pennings et al., ESHRE, supra note 40; Guido Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive
Tourism in Europe, 19 HUM. REPROD. 2689, 2691 (2004).
44
Pennings et al., ESHRE, supra note 40, at 2183.
45
Smith et al., supra note 38, at 4.
46
F. Merlet & B. Sénémaud, Prise en charge du don d‟ovocytes: réglementation du don, la face
cache du tourisme procreative [Egg donation: Regulation of the donation and the hidden face of
the cross-border reproductive care], 38 GYNÉCOLOGIE OBSTÉTRIQUE & FERTILITÉ 36 (2010).
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health care personnel into the private sector.47 Elizabeth Jenner calls this
phenomenon the “fragmentation of health care in settings of exploitation.”48
Commentators on restrictions on assisted reproduction and reproductive
tourism have made valuable contributions to the academic literature. Bioethicist
Guido Pennings has published comprehensive analyses of various methods of
responding to reproductive tourism and has theorized that reproductive tourism
permits moral pluralism to flourish.49 Legal scholars June Carbone and Paige
Gottheim urge the cultivation of public trust through regulatory creativity and
flexibility as a way to achieve compliance from the citizens burdened by
restrictive laws.50 Although Carbone and Gottheim urge relaxation of certain
restrictions, their proposal has the advantage of avoiding the “race to the bottom”
that some associate with calls for international harmonization of laws.51 The
research of anthropologist Marcia Inhorn and physician Pasquale Patrizio reveals
that “[l]egal barriers . . . bespeak the politics of exile,”52 and indeed, in qualitative
studies, “exile” turns out to be “a more accurate descriptor of the patient[s’]
experience.”53
In my own work, I have considered how cross-border reproductive care
itself might affect countries where clinics have expressed a particular eagerness
to meet rising foreign demand for their services.54 Some of these effects include
a surge in egg donation among young women and the possibility that fertility

47

Rupa Chinai & Rahul Goswami, Medical Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism, 85
BULL.
OF
THE
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
161
(2007),
available
at
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/3/07-010307/en/index.html.
48
Elizabeth Jenner, Paper delivered at International Conference on Ethical Issues in Medical
Tourism at Simon Fraser University (June 25, 2010).
49
E.g., Guido Pennings, International Parenthood via Procreative Tourism, in CONTEMPORARY
ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 43 (F. Shenfield & C. Sureau eds., (2006); Guido
Pennings, Cross-border Reproductive Care in Belgium, 24 HUM. REPROD. 3108 (2009); Guido
Pennings, The Green Grass on the Other Side: Crossing Borders to Obtain Infertility Treatment, 1
FACTS, VIEWS & VISION IN OBGYN 1 (2009), available at http://www.fvvo.be/assets/34/02Pennings.pdf; Guido Pennings, International Evolution of Legislation and Guidelines in Medically
Assisted Reproduction, 18 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 15 (2009); Pennings, Legal Harmonization
and Reproductive Tourism in Europe, supra note 43; Guido Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as
Moral Pluralism in Motion, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 337 (2002).
50
See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building
Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509
(2006).
51
Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion, supra note 49, at 338-39 (citing
Linda Nielsen, Procreative Tourism, Genetic Testing and the Law, in FAMILIES ACROSS FRONTIERS
831-48 (N. Lowe & G. Douglas eds., 1996)); Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive
Tourism in Europe, supra note 43, at 2692 (citing Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence
in Europe in the Area of Assisted Conception—Room for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD:
THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 305-24 (D Evans ed., 1996)).
52
Marcia C. Inhorn & Pasquale Patrizio, Rethinking Reproductive ”Tourism” as Reproductive
“Exile,” 92 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 904, 905 (2009).
53
Id. at 906.
54
Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal
Theory, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 295 (2005).
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tourists might consume treatments at a rate that could price some citizens of the
host country out of the market for infertility care. It is further my belief that the
policy of freedom of movement thought essential to European unification allows
local laws restricting reproductive options to flourish by facilitating the
exportation of objectionable behavior which in turn tempers resistance to these
laws at home.55 I have argued most recently that the laws themselves fail to live
up to important standards associated with the judicial protection of fundamental
rights in democratic states.56 The now pressing question is whether states will
elect to prosecute citizens who travel abroad for treatment outlawed at home or
will raise other legal roadblocks aimed at undermining the quest to grow one’s
family through cross-border reproductive care.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Assuming the will and wherewithal to do so, countries with strict policies
against the use of genetic diagnostics in matters concerning human reproduction
may take one of two directions in an attempt to force compliance. First, states
may decide to extend the reach of their prosecutorial powers to instances in
which their citizens procure the prohibited tests overseas. Alternatively, states
may attempt to dissuade their citizens from procuring cross-border PGD by
withholding legal recognition from the children its citizens have crossed borders
to conceive, bear, and rear. Although there is no evidence that states have
employed these tactics against those who travel abroad to obtain PGD, Turkey
has passed a statute criminalizing women who travel abroad for alternative
insemination, and countries around the world have begun to resist recognition of
children born to their citizens via cross-border commercial surrogacy.
A. Prosecution of Reproductive Tourism
Although prosecuting cross-border assisted reproductive care has
previously been unknown, Turkey, seeking to uphold its statute criminalizing the
concealment of a child’s paternity, recently announced that it would imprison
women for up to three years should they seek to become pregnant via artificial
insemination abroad.57 New regulations also prohibit Turkish clinics from
serving as agents for foreign infertility clinics.58 Prior to the issuance of the new
regulations, “inter-clinic collaborations facilitated covert and seamless
treatments” linking Turkish patients with clinics in Cyprus.59 The Turkish
regulations criminalizing patients are reminiscent of Germany’s former attempts,
by means of forced gynecological examinations, to enforce its anti-abortion law

55

Id.
Storrow, The Pluralism Problem in Cross-border Reproductive Care, supra note 27, at 2941.
57
Gozde Zorlu, Overseas Artificial Insemination Outlawed in Turkey, BIONEWS, Mar. 22, 2010.
58
Turkey Bans Trips Abroad for Artificial Insemination, supra note 37.
59
Gürtin-Broadbent, supra note 37.
56
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at its border with Holland.60 The regulations criminalizing physicians are
reminiscent of Italy’s determination to prosecute doctors who referred patients
abroad after Italy’s enactment of restrictions on assisted reproduction in 2004.61
The legal doctrine of extraterritoriality plays a respected role in
international law, allowing a state not only to express the importance of its
legislation but to give it instrumental force as well, within limits. Although
extraterritorial prosecution would be “the most coercive and repressive manner”
of preventing cross-border reproductive care, and would dangerously “increase
feelings of frustration, suppression, and indignation,”62 giving the law
extraterritorial effect is not unknown in related contexts such as medical
tourism63 and abortion.64
Nonetheless, laws are not automatically
extraterritorially applicable: there is a presumption against a law’s having
extraterritorial effect. In the absence of clear statutory language exhibiting an
intent that a statute operate extraterritorially, a state is permitted to express its
interest in controlling the conduct of its citizens even when they are outside of
the country.65 This is known as the nationality principle. An example of the
nationality principle is Canada’s determination to prosecute Canadians who
engage in the sexual exploitation of children while abroad,66 even though other
governments exhibit indifference toward this behavior.67 The United Kingdom

60

See Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive Tourism in Europe, supra note 43, at 339.
See Ferraretti et al., supra note 34, at 265; John E. Robertson, Protecting Embryos and
Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1693, 1695 (2004).
62
Pennings, International Parenthood via Procreative Tourism, supra note 49, at 43, 48, 52.
63
E.g., Xavier Bosch, European Parliament Approves Organ Trade Ban, 362 LANCET 1556 (2003);
David Kilgour, Organ Pillaging, Ongoing Crime Against Humanity by Chinese Party-State, THE
EPOCH TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/43535/ (reporting on
extraterritorial legislation banning transplant tourism proposed in Belgian and Canadian
parliaments); Prosecuting Transplant Tourism (WORLDNEWS NETWORK July 13, 2009), available
at http://wn.com/prosecuting_transplant_tourism (reporting on Chinese prosecution of transplant
tourism).
64
5 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 23-24 (1979) (French incitement to abortion statute); 11 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 44 (1984) (prosecution and imposition of a prison term on a couple for abortion that
took place in Britain).
65
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2), cmt. e (1987).
66
See, e.g., R. v. Klassen, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2485; 2008 BCSC 1762 (Can.).
67
The Canadian legislation makes clear that the offense is deemed to have taken place in Canada;
the classification of the act as an offense does not turn on whether the act is prohibited in the host
country.
See Canada: Legislation Against Child Sex Tourism, http://www.worldtourism.org/protect_children/legislation_country/canada.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2010). This
approach is similar to the U.S., Germany, Australia, and Belgium, but “the laws of Sweden, The
Netherlands and Switzerland will not prosecute a citizen for the crime of sex tourism committed in
another country, unless his action constitutes an offence that violates the law in both countries, the
country of origin and the country of destination where the crime has been committed.” MOHAMED
Y. MATTAR, A REGIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SEX TRAFFICKING AND SEX TOURISM
(2005),
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Regional-ComparativeLegal-Analysis.pdf. This approach to extraterritoriality is known as double criminality. Id. Under
a double criminality approach, the country may be barred from prosecuting if the offender was
61
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will also prosecute such behavior, but only if it is illegal in the country where
committed.68 Another limited exception to the general presumption against
extraterritoriality is embodied in the objective territorial principle. This
principle holds that a state may legislate against conduct abroad that has harmful
effects within the state even if the conduct was committed by a foreigner.69
In its debates over whether in some way to penalize the decision of British
infertility patients to evade the law by travelling overseas, the British House of
Commons heard the testimony of Professor Margaret Brazier to the effect that,
“’No system of regulation can eliminate or effectively control procreative
tourism.’”70 The House of Commons agreed with Brazier, stating, “We believe
that any attempts to curtail reproductive tourism would not be justified by the
seriousness of the offence. Moreover, it would be impossible to enforce if the
treatment was legal in the country concerned.”71 Brazier was careful to limit her
remarks to democratic systems committed to the free movement of persons. In
this connection, she commented:
Extra-territoriality is a very difficult area of criminal jurisdiction. For a
very long time we have limited our extra-territorial jurisdiction to
offences such as homicides and offences against the Crown: sedition
and treason. I do not believe that such extensive invasions of personal
freedom would be compatible with either the European Union treaties
in relation to freedom of movement and freedom of services or the
human rights provision.72

The Turkish assertion of extraterritoriality over cross-border
reproductive care does not carry with it quite the same number of problematic
ramifications as would attend a member state of the European Union’s
determination to do likewise. Extraterritorial prosecution of a European citizen
seeking assisted reproduction banned at home in another European country
would not be permitted under the freedom of movement guaranteed by the

prosecuted in the host country or may be barred from imposing a sentence higher than could have
been imposed in the host country. Id.
68
British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Child sex tourism, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/traveland-living-abroad/be-a-responsible-tourist/child-sex-tourism (last visited Dec. 26, 2010).
69
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attention primarily due to its role in redressing environmental and economic harms. See articles
collected in volume 50 of Law and Contemporary Problems; see also AVC Nederland B.V. v.
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Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557; Auten L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law
from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009).
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164,
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European Charter.73 Moreover, the Turkish law is explicitly extraterritorial such
that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the law is
overcome. Since it is outside of the scope of these brief remarks to explore the
evidentiary hurdles that would attend any attempted enforcement of this law74 or
to discuss what effect this law will have on Turkey’s bid to become a member of
the European Union,75 it is sufficient to conclude that the law places Turkish
women at risk of imprisonment should they seek reproductive assistance abroad.
It is this aspect of the law that sounds a note of caution to those who are
determined to evade the law of their own country by obtaining low-cost PGD
abroad.
B. Legal Interference with Reproductive Tourism
Instead of criminalizing cross-border reproductive travel, many countries
use their laws to interfere with reproductive tourism in other ways. They may
refuse to issue a visa for the new child to return home with her parents after the
birth or, after a successful return to the home country, may refuse legal
recognition of the parent-child relationships that have resulted from a transaction
abroad that would have been illegal at home. Even if the country is willing to
recognize a parent-child relationship, it may refuse to bestow citizenship upon
the child. This is especially likely in cases of surrogacy, which is heavily
restricted or outlawed by many countries around the world and is much easier for
officials to detect76 than are cases of alternative insemination, egg, or embryo
donation that result in the pregnancy of the intending mother abroad but the birth
of the child in the home country.
Unlike the kind of law enacted by Turkey, interference of this sort is
quite common. Citizens of several European and Asian countries, including the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Japan have been
refused travel documents for their children by consular officials upon suspicion
that they had engaged in international commercial surrogacy in the United States,
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India, or the Ukraine.77 Upon arriving home (the children using passports issued
by the countries in which they were born), parents have met with official refusal
to recognize the parent-child relationship or to bestow citizenship upon the
children.78 The French press reports that this happens to about 400 French
couples each year,79 leading lawyer Valérie Depadt-Sebag to designate the
children “a new category of pariahs”80 that reintroduces a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate long ago expunged from the law.81
The danger individuals who flout local laws by traveling abroad to
procure genetic testing in connection with their quest to have children is not quite
the same as is the danger attending law evasion through international surrogacy.
Pre-implantation genetic testing is more akin to artificial insemination or egg
donation in that the procedure occurs prior to the pregnancy of the intending
mother, whereas surrogacy is by definition a pregnancy that the intending mother
does not carry. This renders the problems of international surrogacy much more
salient and returning home much riskier. Still, as the Turkish law indicates,
countries may decide to devote resources to enacting laws that have important
symbolic if not practical ramifications. And even merely symbolic laws can
cause significant emotional and dignitary harm that may not be worth the risk of
their violation.82 In this way, those who would contravene the law of their
country by seeking PGD in permissive jurisdictions will have additional
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informational and psychological hurdles to overcome before they will feel secure
in moving ahead with their reproductive goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The invention of a readily affordable genetic test that could be used in
connection with assisted reproduction raises the distinct possibility that citizens
of countries that already choose or will choose to outlaw such tests will cross
borders in their quest to procure the technology. Some will see this cross-border
movement as an exercise of autonomy that should be respected. Others will see
different interests at stake—future children who have a right not to be treated as
commodities, physicians who should not risk reputational integrity in furtherance
of a eugenic project, and a society with important dignitary interests to protect.
Lawmakers will have a crucial choice to make: permit citizens to exercise their
autonomy by seeking a friendly forum in which to pursue their reproductive
goals or extend the reach of the law to capture instances of extraterritorial law
evasion. The choice will not be simple, as each alternative carries weighty
ramifications for how a society chooses to define responsible parenthood,
medical practice, and citizenship.
Those who carry the dream of becoming parents will also have a crucial
choice. In a world where barriers to international travel have fallen away and
regulation of reproductive technology is far from uniform, the range of decisions
individuals can make about how, when, and where to procreate is wider than it
has ever been. But within this world of choice exist legal forces that would
interfere with if not prevent full and unfettered reproductive decision-making.
These forces will not affect the powerful human drive to procreate, but they will
of necessity play into the choices individuals make as they travel into the future
of reproductive technology.

